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ABSTRACT
This article discusses when a trade secret misappropriation claim can be premised on the
acquisition, disclosure, or use of a product or method derived from a trade secret, rather than the
acquisition, disclosure, or use of a trade secret itself. Although this question is likely to take on
increasing importance as digital products that were made through the use of trade secrets and that
can easily be copied become a larger part of everyday life, courts have rarely focused on it and have
not come to any consensus. In this article, we survey the existing, inconsistent case law and analyze
it in light of the applicable statutory text and relevant public policy considerations. The article
provides some conclusions and takeaways for practitioners.
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THE UNCERTAIN PROTECTION OF "DERIVATIVE" TRADE SECRETS
BENJAMIN J. BRADFORD AND REMI JAFFRÉ*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(“UTSA”), which has been almost universally adopted throughout the United States,
was to promote the development of a nationally uniform body of trade secrets law.
One question, however, is not squarely addressed by the UTSA’s text, and the case
law remains mired in uncertainty: under what circumstances can a trade secrets
claim be premised on the acquisition, disclosure, or use of a product or method
derived from a trade secret, rather than the acquisition, disclosure, or use of the
trade secret, itself. This article refers to such claims as “derivative trade secrets
claims,” and to products or methods derived from trade secrets as “derivatives.”
These claims have conceptual analogs in other areas of intellectual property law.
One of the exclusive rights granted to the owner of a copyright, for example, is the
right “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” 1 The separate
copyright in a derivative work “extends only to the material contributed by the
author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the
work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.” 2 Thus,
absent contractual provisions to the contrary, the copyright owner of the underlying
work has the ability to control the use and distribution of the derivative work, by
virtue of his ownership of the preexisting material incorporated into the derivative
work. No such statutory right exists for trade secrets.
Patent law provides some recognition to “derivative” claims, although not on a
statutory basis as in copyright law. To infringe a patent, the defendant need not
possess or understand the patented invention: it is sufficient that the defendant
“put[s] the invention into service, i.e., control[s] the system as a whole and obtain[s]
benefit from it.”3 In some situations, this means that one can commit patent
infringement by using an unpatented product, if that product derives from a process
or product that is itself patented. For example, the Federal Circuit has held that a
farmer who planted a seed containing the plaintiff’s patented gene sequence had
“used” the patent, reasoning that “[t]he gene itself is being used in the planting.” 4
But in the patent context this principle is not limitless. One court, for example,
dismissed a direct infringement claim against film studios that contracted with a
third party to provide motion capture services using the plaintiff’s patented

* © Benjamin J. Bradford and Remi Jaffré 2019. Benjamin Bradford earned his J.D. from the
University of Chicago Law School. He is a litigation partner at Jenner & Block concentrating on
intellectual property/technology litigation with a focus on computer and internet technologies. Remi
Jaffré earned his J.D. from New York University School of Law. He is a litigator in Jenner &
Block’s Content, Media, and Entertainment Practice Group.
1 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2016).
2 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2016).
3 Centillion Data Sys., LLC v. Qwest Comm’ns Int’l, Inc., 631 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
4 Monsanto Co. v. David, 516 F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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technology, holding that the studios had not “used” the technology by incorporating
its output into their films.5
However, even where the standard for patent “use” quoted above is not met, the
patent laws render liable a person who imports or sells in the United States products
made outside the United States that use a patented process, even if the person never
used the process (directly or indirectly).6 This exception reflects the reality that, due
to the territorial limitations of American patent law, the owner of a patented
technology has no means to prevent or discourage its unauthorized use abroad other
than to control the distribution in the United States of products derived from that
technology.
A derivative trade secret can arise in many circumstances. Perhaps most
straightforwardly, a derivative trade secret can be a good—a soft drink, for
example—produced using a trade secret formula, but not actually containing the
underlying trade secret itself (e.g., the secret formula). Another example of a
derivative trade secret is software that is produced using a data model, where the
data model is the original trade secret. In this example, software for use in a selfdriving car could be based upon trade secret data about the car’s breaking speed,
ability to handle curves on wet roads, and so on. Or, algorithmic stock trading
software might be built in view of a proprietary market model. As a final example, a
derivative trade secret may consume the original trade secret where, for example, a
chemical compound is manufactured using a substance, such as a catalyst, that is a
trade secret.
The ability to control the use or distribution of derivatives is particularly
important in the trade secrets context. Absent such protection, the value of the trade
secret could be usurped without any recourse for the trade secret owner. For
example, someone could abscond with the secret formula for Coca-Cola to a
jurisdiction without sufficient trade secret protection and start producing a CocaCola knock-off for importation into the United States. In such a situation, if the
knock-off manufacturer took sufficient precautions to avoid being subject to U.S.
jurisdiction (e.g., only selling to foreign distributors) Coca-Cola would not have
recourse against the knock-off manufacturer. And, absent derivative trade secret
protection, Coca-Cola also may not have recourse against the importers of the knockoff product, who had no access and did not use the original trade secret – the secret
formula.
As of now, however, there is no judicial consensus on whether derivative trade
secret claims are cognizable. Very few cases have clearly focused on this issue or
tried to develop a conceptual framework for addressing it. Instead, courts faced with
derivative claims tend to be guided by the policy considerations applicable to the
facts of the particular case before them. This case-by-case approach has created an
inconsistent body of law from which it is difficult to discern the general viability of
derivative claims.
This article begins by analyzing the relevant definitional provisions of the
UTSA, which now govern trade secrets claims throughout most of the country, as
well as the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which is widely relied on by
courts as an interpretive guide. It then discusses in more detail the policy
5
6

Rearden LLC v. Walt Disney Co., 293 F. Supp. 3d 963, 973–74 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2016).
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considerations relevant to the recognition of derivative trade secret claims, before
moving to a survey of the existing case law. The article concludes with a summary of
potential takeaways from the case law.
II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
Our analysis begins with the applicable statutory text. As of this writing, 47
states and the District of Columbia have enacted a version of the UTSA.7
Accordingly, misappropriation of trade secrets are typically governed by the UTSA’s
definition of “misappropriation.” The federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”) also
uses the UTSA’s definition of “misappropriation.”8 The UTSA provides:
“Misappropriation” means:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied
consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of a trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that
his knowledge of the trade secret was
(I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to
acquire it;
(II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use; or
(III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or

7 Ala. Code §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (2017); Alaska Stat. §§ 45.50.910–.945 (2017); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 44-401 to -407 (2017); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (2017); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426–3426.10
(2017); Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 7-74-101 to -110 (2017); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-50 to -58 (2017); Del. Code
Ann. Tit. 6, §§ 2001–09 (2017); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 36-401 to -410 (2017); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 688.001–
.009 (2017); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 10-1-760 to -767 (2017); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (2017); Idaho
Code §§ 48-801 to -807 (2017); 765 Ill. Comp. Stat. 1065/1 to 1065/9 (2017); Ind. Code §§ 24-2-3-1 to 2-3-8 (2017); Iowa Code §§ 550.1–.8 (2017); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-3320 to -3330 (2017); Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 365.880–.900 (2017); La. Stat. Ann. §§ 51:1431–:1439 (2017); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
10, §§ 1541–48 (2017); Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (2017); Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §§ 445.1901–.1910 (2017); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 325C.01–.08 (2017); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-26-1
to -19 (2017); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 417.450–.467 (2017); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (2017);
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 87-501 to -507 (2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 600A.010–.100 (2016); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 350-B:1 to :9 (2017); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (2017); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§ 66-152 to -157 (2017); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (2017); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 1333.61–.69 (2017); Okla. Stat. tit. 78, §§ 85–94 (2017); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 646.461–.475
(2016); 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5301–08 (2017); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (2017); S.C.
Code Ann. §§ 39-8-10 to -130 (2017); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 37-29-1 to -11 (2017); Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 47-25-1701 to -1709 (2017); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 134A.001–.008 (2017); Utah
Code Ann. §§ 13-24-1 to -9 (2017); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 4601–09 (2017); Va. Code Ann. §§ 59.1-336
to -343 (2017); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 19.108.010–.930 (2017); W.V. Code Ann. §§ 47-22-1 to -10
(2017); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 134.90 (2017); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-24-101 to -110 (2017).
8 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5) (2016).
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(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had
reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been
acquired by accident or mistake.9
The UTSA definition thus encompasses two types of misappropriation—by
“acquisition” or by “disclosure or use”—which courts analyze separately. While the
statute sets out in detail the mens rea and other requirements for each type of
misappropriation, it does not define the central terms “acquisition” or “use.”
Another notable aspect of the UTSA definition is that it appears to require that
a misappropriator must have knowledge of the trade secrets at issue. This is
especially true for misappropriation by “disclosure or use.” Clauses (A), (B), and (C)
under “disclosure or use” all refer to the defendant’s acquisition or derivation of
“knowledge” of the trade secret. The definition of misappropriation by “acquisition”
does not refer to “knowledge” of the trade secret, but at least one court has
questioned whether it is possible to “acquire” a trade secret without acquiring
knowledge of it.10 As explained below, some courts have ignored the apparent
knowledge requirement in the UTSA’s “disclosure or use” definition entirely, while
those that have addressed it have disagreed on its meaning.
In addition to this statutory language, courts have also looked to the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (“Restatement”), which contains several
sections on trade secrets law.11
The Restatement’s definition of actionable
“appropriation” also includes an “acquisition” prong and a “disclosure or use” prong,
and mirrors the UTSA’s definition in most other respects.12 The Restatement’s
discussion of acquisition is not noteworthy for purposes of this article, but on the
issue of use, the Restatement says the following:
There are no technical limitations on the nature of the conduct that
constitutes “use” of a trade secret . . . . As a general matter, any
exploitation of the trade secret that is likely to result in injury to the trade
secret owner or enrichment to the defendant is a “use” under this
Section. Thus, marketing goods that embody the trade secret, employing the
trade secret in manufacturing or production, relying on the trade secret to
assist or accelerate research or development, or soliciting customers
through the use of information that is a trade secret . . . all constitute
“use.”13
The Restatement thus intends that “use” should be interpreted broadly, and
specifically states that “marketing goods that embody the trade secret” should
constitute actionable use. Indeed, several cases have relied on the Restatement for

UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1985).
See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
11 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEITITION, ch. 4, Topic 2 (1995).
12 Id. § 40. The Restatement further notes that the definition is “intended to be consistent with
and applicable to actions under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act;” Id. § 40 cmt. a.
13 Id. § 40 cmt. c (emphasis added).
9

10
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precisely that proposition.14 Arguably, this language supports the view that
“derivative” trade secrets claims are actionable when they are based on the
defendant’s marketing and sale of goods that “embody” the underlying trade secrets
(a term the Restatement does not define or elaborate on), even if the defendant has
not had direct access to the trade secrets themselves.
Courts thus have little statutory or other authoritative guidance to help them
determine whether to recognize “derivative” claims. Further, what little guidance
there is in the text of the UTSA and the Restatement arguably sends contradictory
signals on this particular question.
III. CASE LAW ON DERIVATIVE TRADE SECRET CLAIMS
As noted above, courts have reached very different conclusions about the
propriety of derivative trade secret claims, while usually failing to recognize the
nature of the issue confronting them. As the cases bear out, the public policy
implications of derivative trade secret claims tend to influence court decisions.
Accordingly, below, this section begins by investigating the policy considerations that
likely form the implicit background of these courts’ decisions. We then survey cases
in which courts have implicitly recognized a derivative claim and cases where courts
have declined to recognize them, bringing to light the focus of these courts’ reasoning.
A. Public Policy Considerations
A principal reason for recognizing derivative trade secret claims is simply that
they further one of the central goals of trade secret law: “the maintenance of
standards of commercial ethics.”15 As one treatise puts it, “[t]he legal protection of
trade secrets stabilizes the relationship of people in commercial transactions by
providing rules of fair play which govern even in the absence of an express
contract.”16
Suppose, for example, that the company DataCo develops a proprietary data
model and contracts with software developer SoftCo (perhaps overseas) to use the
trade secret data model to develop a piece of software, NewSoft. DataCo and SoftCo
enter into an agreement with ironclad protections for DataCo’s trade secret model,
but as can happen, a third-party BadApple somehow obtains a copy of NewSoft—
either by using wrongful means itself, or simply by chance (e.g., because a copy falls
off the back of a truck) but under circumstances making it clear that NewSoft is
derived from DataCo’s proprietary model.17 In either situation, if BadApple makes
copies of NewSoft and starts distributing them, it does so in full awareness that it is
14 See, e.g., Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003)
(applying Georgia law); Cognis Corp. v. ChemCentral Corp., 430 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (N.D. Ill.
2006); PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
15 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (1985) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974)).
16 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 1.3 (1st ed. 1991).
17 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i), (ii). As noted above, the UTSA definition of
“misappropriation” requires some wrongful conduct or a mens rea on the defendant’s part.
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usurping the fruits of DataCo’s investment in developing its trade secret model. It is
no less guilty of breaching commercial ethics than if it had somehow acquired the
trade secret process, rather than its resulting product.
But absent a derivative trade secret claim, the trade secret holder, DataCo, may
not succeed in a claim against the misappropriator, BadApple, either for breach of
contract (because they are not in privity) or for trade secret misappropriation because
BadApple, in theory, does not possess DataCo’s actual trade secret. If SoftCo had
somehow given substantial assistance to BadApple, DataCo might theoretically have
a claim against SoftCo for aiding and abetting BadApple’s misappropriation, but
courts have, by and large, been skeptical that a claim for aiding and abetting trade
secret misappropriation exists.18
A second reason for derivative trade secret recognition is that derivative trade
secret claims may, in some circumstances, be the only way to adequately protect a
trade secret itself. In the hypothetical above, DataCo’s contract with SoftCo contains
protections for DataCo’s trade secret model, which would presumably extend to
SoftCo’s customers. BadApple’s customers, however, are not bound by those
protections when they buy NewSoft from BadApple, and are thus under no obligation
to refrain from reverse engineering the trade secret model—to the extent that would
be feasible—which would destroy the value of the trade secret itself.
Such a scenario may seem far-fetched, but it is not as unlikely as it seems. The
cases in the next two sections describe similar scenarios. These types of scenarios
are, in fact, more likely in today’s computer age because digital products like
software that was manufactured with using a trade secret can easily be copied
without authorization. Thus, for both reasons, there are public policy reasons
counseling in favor of recognizing a derivative trade secret claim.
The reasons against recognizing derivative trade secrets claims mirror policy
reasons for restricting the scope of intellectual property rights in general, namely
that such claims could be exploited to create an unwarranted monopoly or could
subject an innocent party to liability that is deemed unjust. Consistent with those
policy reasons, the argument can be made that the owner of a trade secret should
lose his or her ownership rights after a sufficient distance has been reached along the
supply chain from the trade secret itself. Granting trade secret owners the rights to
control the use and distribution of all goods derived from those secrets, no matter
how remote, potentially extends the specter of liability to millions of buyers of those
goods. While, as explained above, actionable misappropriation under the UTSA
cannot occur without wrongful conduct or some degree of mens rea, the risk of
embroiling millions of innocent end-users of goods in trade secrets litigation counsels
against excessive broadening of a trade secret owner’s rights. As one court has
remarked, potentially exposing innocent end-users to the costs of litigation would
depress consumer demand in certain markets, hindering the development of those
markets and discouraging innovation. 19

18 See, e.g., Legacy Separators LLC v. Halliburton Energy Servs. Inc., No. 4:14-CV-2081, 2016
WL 4386130, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2016); But cf. Stoneeagle Servs., Inc. v. Davis, 2013 WL
12143946, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2013) (declining to dismiss secondary liability claims based on
the defendants’ aiding and abetting the misappropriation of a trade secret).
19 Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 41 (Ct. App. 2010).
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This dichotomy between bad actors who knowingly exploit a product derived
from a trade secret and innocent actors who unknowingly obtain an unauthorized
derivative is also reflected in the cases that address derivative trade secret claims, as
discussed in the next two sections. Courts tend to want to hold the bad actors liable,
while not punishing the innocent actors.
B. Cases Recognizing Derivative Trade Secrets Claims
1. Misappropriation by Acquisition
We have identified only two cases arguably involving derivative trade secrets
claims for misappropriation by acquisition. Those cases provide some support for the
view that such claims can exist if the trade secret at issue is susceptible to reverse
engineering from the derivative. In ATS Products, Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass,
Inc.,20 the plaintiff, ATS, alleged that it owned “trade secrets relating to: (1) formulas
for making fire-safe plastics by combining phenol-resorcinol resins with catalysts
and/or fillers, and (2) information regarding the best methods and practices for using
resins, hardeners and fillers to manufacture plastic products.”21 ATS’s predecessor
worked with the defendant, Champion, to develop products using ATS’s resins. One
of Champion’s employees then formed his own company, Thermalguard, and began
building resins using ATS’s trade secrets without authorization. ATS prevailed in a
separate lawsuit against Thermalguard and the former employee. 22
In this subsequent lawsuit against Champion, ATS alleged that Champion had
bought misappropriated resins from Thermalguard, and used them to produce the
“Flame Shield” product that Champion then sold to the Bay Area Rapid
Transit.23 Although it was not alleged that Champion ever possessed the trade
secrets themselves, the court held that the complaint stated a claim against
Champion for misappropriation by acquisition, relying on the allegation that “the
resins are susceptible to reverse engineering which would, in turn, yield the trade
secrets to anyone who possessed the resins.”24 The rule suggested by ATS Products is
that one “acquires” a trade secret when one acquires a product from which the trade
secret can be reverse engineered or otherwise learned.
However, an earlier case suggests that no actionable “acquisition” takes place
until the defendant has actually reverse engineered the trade secret. In Minnesota
Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc.,25 the
defendant, JJO, received samples of a new slippery resin under development by the
plaintiff, 3M, under circumstances that JJO’s president concluded were suspicious,

20 ATS Prod., Inc. v. Champion Fiberglass, Inc., No. C 13-02403 SI, 2013 WL 6086924 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 19, 2013).
21 Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at *3.
25 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johson Orthopaedics, Inc., Civ. No. 4-86-359,
1991 WL 441901 (D. Minn. Apr. 30, 1991).
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according to his own testimony.26 The court found that JJO nevertheless chemically
analyzed the samples to determine the key novel ingredient, and that [b]y reason of
its receipt and use of the…samples, JJO was able to bring its [own] product to
market three months earlier than it otherwise would have. 27 The court held that JJO
had misappropriated 3M’s trade secret stating: “JJO acquired 3M’s trade secret as a
result of its chemical analysis of the [resin] samples, identifying the slip agents. JJO
then used this trade secret to make its own slippery resin product.” 28 However,
addressing a statute of limitations argument, the court further stated:
Actionable acquisition of 3M’s trade secret did not occur until JJO analyzed
the samples and successfully discovered the slippery resin formula. Had
JJO merely locked the samples in a cabinet, or analyzed them and failed to
discover the formula, 3M would have been hard pressed to sue for
misappropriation.
The
statute
defines
“trade
secret”
as
“information.” Mere possession of the rolls did not allow JJO to acquire the
“information” about the roll’s slippery resin. Only the analysis allowed that
acquisition.29
Arguably, then, the claim recognized by the Minnesota Mining case was not a
derivative claim at all, because it required the defendant to come into direct contact
with the trade secrets themselves. But Minnesota Mining can also be read to support
the existence of derivative claims if it is interpreted as holding that a derivative
claim for misappropriation by acquisition requires only that the defendant exploit the
trade secret derivative in some manner—in this case, by using it to reverse engineer
the trade secret. This reading of Minnesota Mining makes it consistent with ATS
Products, in which Champion exploited the derivative resin by making and selling its
“Flame Shield” product.
2. Misappropriation by Use
The case law on derivative claims for misappropriation by use is more developed,
and the weight of authority generally recognizes such claims. Several cases have
held that a defendant can be liable for selling goods that were made by using a trade
secret, even if the goods were made by a third party and the defendant never
possessed the trade secrets themselves.
In ClearOne Communications, Inc. v. Chiang,30 the plaintiff, ClearOne, alleged
that a former employee breached a non-disclosure agreement by providing
ClearOne’s “Honeybee Code”—a computer source code and object code used to
improve the quality of a speakerphone produced by ClearOne—to the third-party,
WideBand.31 WideBand used the Honeybee Code to derive its own “WideBand Code,”
Id. at *46.
Id. at *48.
28 Id. at *77.
29 Id. at *78 (citation omitted).
30 ClearOne Comm’ns, Inc. v. Chiang, No. 2:07-cv-37 TC, 2007 WL 4376125 (D. Utah Dec. 13,
2007)
31 See id. at *2–3.
26
27
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which it then licensed to defendant Biamp. More importantly, WideBand licensed
the WideBand Code in “object code” form—i.e., in the form of zeros and ones legible
only by computers and not by humans. Biamp, in turn, incorporated the code into an
“echo acoustic cancellation sound card,” which was widely distributed.32 Biamp
argued that it “never had knowledge of the allegedly misappropriated trade secret
because it could not read the object code.” 33 The court denied Biamp’s motion to
dismiss, holding that “[t]here is no requirement of comprehension of the trade secret
to state a claim for misappropriation under the Utah [UTSA].”34 It also emphasized
allegations that Biamp knew that WideBand had derived the WideBand code
through improper means.35 The claim in ClearOne can be thought of as a derivative
claim, because Biamp never had direct access to the human-legible source code
constituting the trade secret, and only had access to the object code derived from it.
Similarly, in Cognis Corp. v. ChemCentral Corp.,36 the plaintiff, Cognis,
developed a formula and production method for CAPCURE, “a distinctive curing
agent for epoxy resin adhesive.” 37 Non-party GabePro, a former manufacturer of
CAPCURE for Cognis, began to produce a CAPCURE equivalent using Cognis’s
technology, and sued Cognis in state court seeking a declaration that this did not
violate Cognis’s rights. Cognis counterclaimed in the state-court action, for
misappropriation of trade secrets. In a separate federal lawsuit, filed a year and a
half later, Cognis sued GabePro’s distributor ChemCentral, which allegedly
continued to solicit customers for and sell GabePro’s CAPCURE equivalent despite
knowing about the state-court lawsuit.38
The court in the federal lawsuit recognized that Cognis never alleged “that
[ChemCentral] ever knew the formula or manufacturing process for CAPCURE or
[the equivalent],” and that its theory was “that distribution of a product
manufactured by another’s use of a trade secret constitutes use of that trade
secret.”39 The court nevertheless denied ChemCentral’s motion to dismiss, holding
that “Cognis’s allegations show that it is possible, under a broad reading of the word
‘use,’ that it may be able to show that [ChemCentral] misappropriated its trade
secrets” by marketing the CAPCURE equivalent with knowledge of the state-court
lawsuit between Cognis and GabePro. 40 In so concluding, the court relied on Illinois
precedent and on the Restatement provision quoted above, which the court
interpreted as endorsing a “very broad” understanding of “use.” 41 The court also
highlighted allegations that ChemCentral was aware that Cognis protected its
technology and of the lawsuit against GabePro in concluding that ChemCentral
satisfied the UTSA’s mens rea requirement.42
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
34 Id.
35 Id. at *2–3.
36 Cognis Corp. v. ChemCentral Corp., 430 F. Supp. 2d 806 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
37 Id. at 808.
38 Complaint at 6, Cognis Corp. v. ChemCentral Corp., 430 F. Supp. 2d 806 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No.
05-cv-6344), ECF No. 1.
39 Cognis, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 811–12.
40 Id. at 813.
41 Id. at 812.
42 Id. at 812–13.
32
33
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In a third case, VIA Technologies, Inc. v. ASUS Computer International,43 the
plaintiff, VIA, alleged that two Taiwanese corporations acquired its controller chip
technology by conducting a “mass raiding” of VIA employees, who breached severance
agreements with VIA by providing the technology to the Taiwanese corporations. 44
The Taiwanese corporations then allegedly manufactured chips incorporating VIA’s
technology. VIA brought suit in California against ACI, an American affiliate of the
Taiwanese corporations. Because VIA sought relief only for actions that took place in
the United States, its claim against ACI was based only on ACI’s marketing and sale
of the infringing chips.45 The complaint did not allege that ACI itself had been
directly involved in the use of VIA’s trade secrets to manufacture the chips at issue. 46
The court nevertheless held that VIA had sufficiently alleged misappropriation
against ACI.47 In so holding, it relied on the statement that “marketing goods that
embody the trade secret constitutes use of the trade secret,” and also cited the Cognis
case.48 The court also noted the complaint’s allegation that ACI sold the chips “with
the knowledge that those products were made using the trade secrets.”49
Finally, in X6D, Ltd. v. Li-Tek Corps. Co.,50 the plaintiffs alleged that they
provided proprietary manufacturing and design information for 3D glasses to one of
the defendants, Li-Tek, under a manufacturing outsourcing agreement. Li-Tek
allegedly retained this information and manufactured its own unauthorized 3D
glasses, and another group of defendants allegedly served as the distributors for the
unauthorized glasses under the trade name Etoniq.51 The Etoniq defendants moved
to dismiss, arguing that they did not use the trade secret information because the
glasses were manufactured by Li-Tek, which did not move to dismiss. The court
disagreed, holding that the moving defendants’ sale of the glasses was a sufficient
allegation of use of trade secrets.52 Once again, the court relied on the Restatement
and singled out the Restatement’s assertion that “marketing goods that embody the
trade secret” constitutes use.53 The court also held that the complaint sufficiently
alleged that the Etoniq defendants had knowledge that the glasses were
manufactured using the plaintiffs’ trade secrets.54
It is notable that in all four of these cases, the defendant was a commercial
distributor of the derivative, not merely an end-user. As a comparison with the cases
discussed in the next section shows, courts are more inclined to find derivative trade
secrets liability where the defendant engaged in the distribution of the derivative
goods for profit than where the defendant is a mere end-user of the product. The
“maintenance of standards of commercial ethics” quite logically supports liability for
43 VIA Tech., Inc. v. ASUS Comput. Int’l, No. 14-cv-03586-BLF, 2015 WL 3809382 (N.D. Cal.
June 18, 2015).
44 Id. at *1.
45 Id. at *5.
46 See id. at *1–2.
47 Id. at *4.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 X6D, Lyd. v. Li-Tek Corps. Co., No. CV 10-2327-GHK (PJWx), 2010 WL 11512197 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 26, 2010).
51 Id. at *1.
52 Id. at *3.
53 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD ) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. C (1995)).
54 Id.
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a defendant who profits from the distribution of a product knowing that the product
was created using another’s trade secrets without authorization, as was alleged to be
the case in all four cases discussed in this section.
While these cases are consistent with general public policy principles, they may
not satisfy the statutory requirement that the misappropriator have “knowledge” of
the relevant trade secret, as discussed above. Cognis, VIA Technologies, and X6D do
not even mention this issue. The ClearOne court addresses this issue briefly in a
footnote, but its analysis on this point is not persuasive. In considering Biamp’s
argument that it could not be liable for misappropriation because it did not
understand the indecipherable object code that had been licensed to it, the court held
that “[t]here is no requirement of comprehension of the trade secret to state a claim”
under the UTSA.55 Then, in a footnote, the court recognized that the UTSA “uses the
phrase ‘knowledge of the trade secret,’” but held that “this phrase is generally
understood to reflect knowledge that the trade secret was derived through improper
means.”56
Although this reading is consistent with the outcomes in Cognis, VIA
Technologies, and X6D, it arguably creates some tension with regard to the text of
the UTSA. For example, clause (A) of the definition of misappropriation by
disclosure or use covers a person who “used improper means to acquire knowledge of
a trade secret.”57 Under the ClearOne court’s interpretation, the definition would
cover a person who used improper means to acquire knowledge that the trade secret
at issue was derived through improper means, which makes little sense. The
argument could be made, however, that the words “knowledge of a trade secret” in
the UTSA are more plausibly read to require that the defendant have knowledge of
the trade secret itself, and that the defendant’s knowledge of the circumstances
under which the trade secret was acquired or derived is addressed in the rest of the
definition of “misappropriation.”
But the ClearOne opinion does suggest one way of reconciling derivative claims
with the “knowledge of the trade secret” requirement. Other courts have agreed with
ClearOne’s observation that “knowledge” does not mean “comprehension,”58 and one
court, although taking a dim view of derivative claims generally, has stated that, “at
least in some circumstances,” the UTSA requirement might be satisfied by
“constructive knowledge of the secret.”59 The same court further explained: “one who
knowingly possesses information constituting a trade secret cannot escape liability
merely because he lacks the technical expertise to understand it, or does not speak
the language in which it was written.”60 One who possesses a product from which a
trade secret can be reverse engineered is arguably in the same position, with reverse
engineering taking the place of translation in the court’s hypothetical. If so,

ClearOne, 2007 WL 4376125, at *2.
Id. at *2 n.3.
57 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(ii)(A) (1985).
58 See Advanced Recovery Sys., LLC v. Am. Agencies, LLC, No. 2:13CV283DAK, 2017 WL
3912984, at *6 (D. Utah Sept. 6, 2017); Silvaco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42 (“A requirement of
‘knowledge of the trade secret’ simply is not a requirement that the defendant ‘comprehend’ the
secret or learn its ‘details.’”).
59 Silvaco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 42 n.7. This case is discussed in more detail at pages 19–21.
60 Id.
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derivative claims can satisfy the UTSA’s “knowledge of the trade secret” requirement
through the defendant’s constructive knowledge.
That principle may have been at work in Advanced Recovery Systems, LLC v.
American Agencies, LLC,61 in which the plaintiff, AA, brought a misappropriation
claim against several companies and individual defendants. AA input its trade
secrets—customer lists, debt information and collection efforts, data about business
transactions, and the like—into debt collection software created by one of the
defendant companies, ARS. AA alleged that the defendants misappropriated the
trade secrets when ARS sold the software, AA’s information included, to one of the
other defendants in violation of an agreement with the plaintiff. The individual
defendants, apparent officers of the corporate defendants, argued that they “never
accessed AA’s data and, thus, did not learn the secret.”62 But the court disagreed,
stating that the individual defendants “had possession of and access to AA’s trade
secrets.”63 The court appeared to take the position that the individual defendants’
possession of the software was enough, even though they claimed never to have
accessed the information contained in the software.
The distinction between “knowledge” in the form of possession, on one hand, and
“comprehension,” which courts appear to agree is not required under the UTSA, on
the other, could be one way to resolve the apparent tension between derivative trade
secret claims and the UTSA’s “knowledge of the trade secret” requirement. A
plaintiff bringing a derivative claim could argue that the defendant’s possession of
the derivative constitutes constructive knowledge of the secret, which is akin to
possessing information that one lacks the technical expertise to understand. That
position may be more persuasive the easier it is to reverse engineer the trade secret.
The more difficult this process is, the more strained the analogy becomes to
possessing technical information one does not understand. Thus, as was the case for
misappropriation by acquisition claims, the degree to which that trade secret can be
reversed engineered from the derivative is a potentially important factual aspect of a
derivative claim for misappropriation by use. When the trade secret can be reversed
engineered relatively easily, there is a strong argument that a derivative claim
satisfies the “knowledge of the trade secret” requirement.
C. Cases Not Recognizing Derivative Trade Secrets Claims
The opinion in Silvaco Data Systems v. Intel Corp.64 is, perhaps, the most
comprehensive judicial analysis of derivative trade secrets claims to date. In that
case, the plaintiff, Silvaco, created a piece of software called SmartSpice, which
simulated the properties of an electronic circuit before it was physically built. CSI, a
competitor, misappropriated the trade secrets used in SmartSpice, aided by two
former Silvaco employees, and used them to create its own software,
DynaSpice. After obtaining a judgment against CSI, Silvaco brought actions against
Advanced Recovery Sys., 2017 WL 3912984, at *6.
Id. at *6 (citing Silvaco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d).
63 Id.
64 Silvaco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 41.
61
62
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several users of DynaSpice, including the defendant in this case, Intel, alleging that
their use of the DynaSpice software was a misappropriation of Silvaco’s trade secrets,
namely, those embedded in the source code of SmartSpice. Intel defended against
the claim by noting that it had never possessed or had access to any part of the
SmartSpice source code: all it had was the object code (i.e. the zeros and ones, which
are incomprehensible upon visual inspection) of the CSI software.
In affirming the trial court, the appellate court rejected Silvaco’s acquisition
claim on the basis that Intel had never come “into possession of the source code
constituting the claimed trade secrets.”65 The court continued:
Indeed, Silvaco does not directly argue that Intel acquired the trade secrets
at issue but only that, under the terms of the statute, it could have done so
without itself having “knowledge” of them. We doubt the soundness of this
suggestion, but assuming it is correct, it remains beside the point unless
Intel came into possession of the secret.66
Thus, the Silvaco court strongly implied that the defendant’s knowledge of the
relevant trade secret—which, as discussed above, is not explicitly part of the UTSA’s
definition of misappropriation by acquisition—is nonetheless a required element of a
misappropriation by acquisition claim.
The Silvaco court then went on to reject Silvaco’s misappropriation by use claim
premised on Intel’s use of the DynaSpice software. Its reasoning is worth quoting at
length:
One clearly engages in the “use” of a secret, in the ordinary sense, when one
directly exploits it for his own advantage, e.g., by incorporating it into his
own manufacturing technique or product. But “use” in the ordinary sense is
not present when the conduct consists entirely of possessing, and taking
advantage of, something that was made using the secret. One who bakes a
pie from a recipe certainly engages in the “use” of the latter; but one who
eats the pie does not, by virtue of that act alone, make “use” of the recipe in
any ordinary sense, and this is true even if the baker is accused of stealing
the recipe from a competitor, and the diner knows of that accusation. Yet
this is substantially the same situation as when one runs software that was
compiled from allegedly stolen source code. The source code is the recipe
from which the pie (executable program) is baked (compiled).67
Silvaco can be understood to hold that the use of a derivative does not constitute use
of the trade secret itself—a holding that appears to foreclose derivative claims for
misappropriation by use.
Silvaco, however, differs factually from a typical derivative claim in several
respects. First, the defendant in Silvaco, Intel, was an “end-user” of the product
made using the trade secret, rather than the marketer and seller of the product.
Instead, Intel positioned itself as a customer of a typical derivative claim defendant,
Id. at 40.
Id.
67 Id. at 41.
65
66
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rather than the defendant itself. This expressly factored into the Silvaco court’s
conclusion that Intel had not committed actionable “use” of Silvaco’s trade secrets.
The court explained:
If merely running finished software constituted a use of the source code
from which it was compiled, then every purchaser of software would be
exposed to liability if it were later alleged that the software was based in
part upon purloined source code. This risk could be expected to inhibit
software sales and discourage innovation to an extent far beyond the
intentions and purpose of [the California UTSA].68
VIA Technologies, which upheld a derivative misappropriation by use claim,
distinguished Silvaco on precisely this basis, stating: “Silvaco, however, dealt with a
. . . claim against an end user of the product, not a party actively marketing and
selling the product for use by others.”69
Relatedly, in Silvaco it is unclear whether Intel satisfied the mens rea
requirements of the UTSA’s definition of misappropriation. The Silvaco court
emphasized that Intel had originally purchased DynaSpice without any knowledge of
how it was developed, and that it had learned only later of mere claims by Silvaco
that CSI had derived DynaSpice from Silvaco’s trade secrets without authorization.70
The court further explained: “Only when CSI entered into a stipulated judgment
requiring it to stop using Silvaco code could an outsider rationally conclude that
there was substance to Silvaco’s claims. But that very judgment authorized CSI to
continue marketing and supporting its products provided they were modified to
excise Silvaco’s trade secrets.”71 Thus, the court stated, “it is far from apparent that
Intel’s conduct here offended any sound or settled standard of commercial ethics.” 72
This distinguishes Silvaco from ClearOne, Cognis, VIA Technologies, and X6D, in
which, as noted above, it was alleged that the defendant knew that the derivative at
issue was derived from the plaintiff’s trade secrets.
Finally, in Silvaco it was “undisputed that the object code executed by Intel
could not disclose the underlying source code or permit the exploitation of its features
and design.” 73 In other words, the parties agreed that the trade secret at issue (the
source code) could not be reverse engineered from the derivative (the object code).
This distinguishes Silvaco from ATS Products, in which the court upheld an
acquisition claim based on the defendant’s possession of a product from which the
relevant trade secrets could be reverse engineered. And as explained above, the
degree to which the relevant trade secrets can be reverse engineered logically has an
effect on the persuasiveness on a derivative claim for misappropriation by use as
well.
These aspects of the facts underlying Silvaco—the concession that the trade
secrets could not be reverse engineered, Intel’s status as an end user, and Intel’s
Id. at 41.
VIA Tech., 2015 WL 3809382, at *4.
70 Silvaco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 46.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 38.
68
69
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“innocence”—suggest that the Silvaco court’s sweeping statements about the
meaning of “acquisition” and “use” are of more limited reach than they first appear.
Perhaps for this reason, Silvaco has been relied on much less than might be expected
for having such a long and thoroughly reasoned opinion.
The main exception is ATS Products, discussed above. Although the court in
ATS Products held that the defendant’s alleged acquisition of a resin from which the
plaintiff’s trade secrets could be reverse engineered stated an acquisition claim, in
reliance on Silvaco, it dismissed the plaintiff’s derivative misappropriation by use
claim arising out of the same facts. It explained that the plaintiff, ATS, “has not
alleged that [the defendant] Champion exploited its trade secrets for its own gain, an
act that would constitute use. ATS has only alleged that Champion used the resin—
not the trade secret formulas—to create the . . . product that it eventually sold to
BART.”74 Like Silvaco, the court in ATS Products took the position that use of a
derivative does not constitute actionable use of the underlying trade secrets.
Other courts dismissing what are effectively derivative trade secrets claims have
not relied on Silvaco, and instead have tended to conceptualize the claims as
attempting to impose secondary, or aiding-and-abetting, liability on the defendants.
For example, in Control Module, Inc. v. Data Management, Inc.,75 the plaintiff,
Control Module, manufactured data-entry and control computer terminals according
to the requirements of defendant, Data Management, which created software for use
on the terminals. Encouraged by Data Management, two Control Module employees
created their own company, Xipher, which produced terminals using Control
Module’s technology and sold them to Data Management. Control Module sued Data
Management for misappropriation, but the court dismissed the claim, stating:
The Complaint does not allege that Data Management itself acquired or
disclosed or used the Trade Secrets, only that Data Management purchased
Integrity terminals from Xipher and that Data Management induced,
encouraged, aided, or abetted the principals of Xipher to use the Trade
Secrets in creating the Integrity terminals. However, [the California
UTSA] does not include within its definition of “misappropriation” inducing,
encouraging, aiding, or abetting another to misappropriate a trade secret.76
Similarly, in a pre-Silvaco case, Sonoma Foods, Inc. v. Sonoma Cheese Factory,
LLC,77 the plaintiff hired a third party, Rumiano, to make flavored Jack cheese
products based on recipes and formulas alleged to be trade secrets.78 Rumiano
terminated its relationship with the plaintiff, but continued to use the secrets to
make cheese products, which it sold to defendant Cheese Factory. The court held
that the plaintiff had not stated a misappropriation claim against Cheese Factory,
which was alleged to be “merely a retail operation [that] does not make cheese

ATS Prods., 2013 WL 6086924, at *3.
Control Module, Inc. v. Data Mgmt., No. 3:07CV00475 (AWT), 2007 WL 4333814 (D. Conn.
Dec. 10, 2007).
76 Id. at *4.
77 Sonoma Foods, Inc. v. Sonoma Cheese Factory, LLC, No. C 07-00554 JSW, 2008 WL 913279
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2008).
78 Id. at *3.
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products.”79 The court explained that the plaintiff had not alleged that Cheese
Factory had “used, disclosed, or marketed trade secrets—the recipes for Plaintiff’s
flavored Jack cheese products,” but rather that Rumiano was alleged to have done
so.80 The court thus framed the claim as involving secondary liability, and concluded
that “[p]laintiff has not alleged facts to support its theory that Cheese Factory may
be vicariously or jointly liable for Rumiano’s conduct.”81
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND TAKEAWAYS
As the foregoing makes clear, whether derivative trade secret claims are
cognizable is still an open question in many jurisdictions. The cases on this issue are
inconsistent and generally focus on the specific facts before them without addressing
the broader conceptual issue of whether such claims should be recognized. This
means that it is hard to draw useful generalizations from these cases.
Nevertheless, the optics of a particular derivative claim appear to influence
whether it is ultimately successful. A derivative claim is more likely to be upheld
where the defendant is distributing the derivative for profit with the full knowledge
that it was derived from trade secrets without authorization. As the Silvaco case
shows, however, courts will understandably be more reluctant to find liability where
the defendant is “innocent” and did not know about the trade secret origins of the
derivative. Courts are also less likely to extend liability to mere end-users of a
product than to those who attempt to profit off the plaintiff’s trade secrets. Given the
uncertain state of the law, it is incumbent on the plaintiff’s litigation counsel to
ensure that the defendant does not come across as an unsuspecting innocent party
caught up in a trade secret dispute that does not concern it.
Another factor that appears to impact the outcome of a derivative trade secret
claim is the degree to which the trade secret can be reverse engineered. For
misappropriation by acquisition claims, if the trade secret can be reverse engineered,
there is a strong argument that acquiring the derivative effectively means acquiring
the trade secret itself. The fact that, in Silvaco, it was conceded that the trade
secrets could not be reverse engineered may partly account for the difference in
outcome between the acquisition claims in that case and in ATS Products. As to
misappropriation by use claims, a plaintiff will have a stronger argument that the
UTSA’s “knowledge of the trade secret” requirement is satisfied if he can argue that
the defendant’s possession of the derivative amounts to constructive knowledge of the
trade secret itself.
This is somewhat paradoxical, because the easier a trade secret is to reverse
engineer, the greater the danger that it will in fact be reverse engineered and lose its
trade secret protection. Accordingly, plaintiffs bringing derivative claims must take
the usual precautions of owners of trade secrets that can easily be reverse
engineered—namely, they must control the distribution of their derivatives through
licenses, confidentiality agreements, contractual restrictions on reverse engineering,
and the like.
Id.
Id.
81 Id.
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Litigation over the status of trade secret derivatives is not likely to disappear
any time soon, but that status is still unclear. Given the idiosyncratic facts of
Silvaco, which to date is the only case to squarely discuss the issue of derivative
trade secrets claims, this is an area of the law that could benefit from further judicial
discussion and development.

